Each of the 131 articles from Science & Education was evaluated (Levels I–V) with respect to the context in which they referred to objectivity. Based on the treatment of the subject by the authors following 37 categories (sections) were developed to report and discuss the results (cf. guidelines presented above from Charmaz, 2005). These categories along with the examples are presented in alphabetical order. It is important to note that some of the articles could easily be placed in more than one category. The idea behind the creation of 35 categories (sections) is to facilitate the reader to find the subject of her/his interest. It is important to note that Science & Education has a readership and contributors that include science educators, historians, philosophers of science and sociologists that cover many areas of the science curriculum. Given the wide range of subjects discussed by the authors over a period of more than 20 years, it is difficult to create the semblance of a continuous storyline (as suggested by one of the reviewers). For example, in the 1990s constructivism was a subject of considerable importance, and in recent years the research community seems to have lost interest in it. Similarly, due to limitations of space it is not possible to present a detailed critical analysis of every article. Complete information about each article and the author is provided in the appendices (1 and 2) which can be consulted by the interested readers. Next, examples from the 35 categories are presented. Show
3.2.1 Argumentation and ObjectivityThe role of argumentation in the classroom has been the subject of considerable research in the science education literature. Drawing on the work of Longino (1990, 2002), Jiménez-Aleixandre (2012) has explored the relationship between objectivity in science and explanatory plurality:
With this background the author has followed argumentation in genetics classrooms requiring models to build explanations, which leads to the framing of genetics issues in their social context. Campbell (1988a) a methodologist had referred to “explanatory plurality” as plausible rival hypotheses, quite similar to Longino. The presentation of Jiménez-Aleixandre (2014) comes quite close to what Daston and Galison (2007) have referred to as trained judgment. 3.2.2 Classification of Species and ObjectivityAccording to Takacs and Ruse (2013), classification presents a number of interesting issues in the philosophy of biology:
Authors also go beyond by pointing out the subjectivity involved in for example in the inclusion of Homo sapiens along with Homo erectus and Homo habilis in the genus Homo. Again they raise the issue of whether there would be consensus in including the Australopithecus afarensis (to which the famous fossil Lucy belongs) in the genus Homo. This clearly shows how different interpretations lead to controversies that produce tension in our understanding of the objectivity–subjectivity duality. 3.2.3 Commodification of Science and ObjectivityCommodification and commercialization of science has been the subject of recent research in science education (see the special issue edited by G. Irzik, 2013). This research shows that scientific knowledge becomes more and more like a commodity as part of the market economy in which the influence of money and corporate research become dominant. In some cases universities and research institutions become increasingly organized like a private company. In this context, according to Vermeir (2013):
The basic characteristics and norms of science refer to the Mertonian norms that include: sharing and openness in scientific practice, truthfulness, objectivity, trust, accuracy, and respect for expertise (Merton, 1979). The transition from trained judgment to mechanical objectivity in the context of commercialization of science is a cause of concern for Vermeir and perhaps also for many science educators. However, according to Daston and Galison, the transition from one extreme (mechanical objectivity) to another (trained judgment) can go back and forth. 3.2.4 Consciousness and ObjectivityAccording to Marroum (2004):
Marroum’s work is based on the cognitional theory of Bernard Lonegran, who does not provide ready-made answers to readers. His approach requires teachers to first self-appropriate what they are teaching to the students. It facilitates the integration of the history of science into the curriculum. He suggests that when students discover what they have in common with Archimedes, Aristotle, Galileo, Newton, Maxwell, and other scientists, they will develop confidence in their ability to learn (It is not clear if Marroum follows this historical approach. For further details on Lonegran’s theory, see Roscoe, 2004). Furthermore, in order for learning to be meaningful, the student must move beyond subjective knowledge to objective knowledge. 3.2.5 Constructivism and ObjectivityGiven the considerable amount of controversy in the science education literature with respect to radical and social constructivism, this section has the following four presentations: Suchting (1992), Slezak (1994), and Garrison (1997, 2000). However, in recent years interest in constructivism has declined. In the context of his criticism of the subjective realism espoused by radical constructivism (Ernst von Glasersfeld), Suchting (1992) clarifies that contrary to popular belief, immutability and certainty have nothing essential to do with our understanding of objectivity (p. 226). For example, the Galilean transformation equations of classical kinematics proved not to be immutable, as they are replaced in special relativity by different and more general equations. Similarly, the approximations in Galilean equations are not less objective than the previously non-approximate ones. The other characteristic that sometimes is invoked to understand objectivity is certainty. For example, the statement that “Isaac Newton was born on 4 January 1643” is considered to be certain and an instance of objective knowledge. However, even such statements are problematic as the information included may be erroneous or false. In this context, for Suchting (1992), understanding of immutability and certainty show the problematic nature of objectivity. Classified as Level III. According to Slezak (1994):
In order to facilitate the ethical dimensions of science (which may be weakened by social constructivism) the author endorses Merton’s “ethos of science” (p. 270). Furthermore, the traditional conventions regarding scientific publications have been the subject of considerable controversy in the history and philosophy of science literature (e.g., Medawar, Holton, Polanyi), as they depart from how science is actually done, namely “science in the making” (cf. Niaz, 2012). Garrison (1997) critiques Von Glasersfeld’s radical constructivism as subjectivist and instead recommends Deweyan social constructivism based on experimentalism as an alternative:
Garrison (2000) also refers to Ernst von Glasersfeld’s constructivism as subjectivist: “It is a peculiarly subjectivist form of constructivism that should not be attractive to science and mathematics education concerned with retaining some sort of realism that leaves room for objectivity” (p. 615). Garrison ignores the historical context in which objectivity is always achieved in degrees, namely the recognition that it is a process. It is plausible to suggest that Garrison’s position approximates to an academic form of objectivity that is Level II. In the framework of Daston and Galison (2007), both presentations by Garrison (1997, 2000) represent mechanical objectivity. 3.2.6 Controversy and ObjectivityAccording to Hildebrand, Bilica, and Capps (2008), controversies in science education are more intractable than those in science as they involve a wider range of considerations, such as epistemic, social, ethical, political, and religious. Authors then consider the controversy between Intelligent Design Creationism (IDC) and evolution and present the following possible strategies generally used in the biology classroom: (a) Teach the controversy—this strategy assumes that students should be allowed to make up their own minds on controversial issues; (b) Avoidance—in this case teachers may choose to omit controversial topics; and (c) Dogmatism—this alternative would dismiss the controversy altogether. In contrast, these authors suggest a proactive, philosophically pragmatic approach based on the work of John Dewey (1925/1983), according to which knowledge is achieved primarily through a process of inquiry that is characterized by its social, experimental, and fallible nature. Furthermore, inquiry begins for most people not with abstract puzzles but with concrete problematic situations. This approach neither avoids nor ignores controversy and thus goes beyond the narrow epistemological solutions generally presented in school science:
The problematic nature of objectivity in this presentation is quite peculiar. Proponents of IDC support a commitment to objectivity as this would allow them to include their ideas with respect to evolution. This clearly shows how biology teachers may have to be more thoughtful while introducing objectivity in the classroom. Following a historical reconstruction of the topic of chemical equilibrium in the chemistry curriculum, Quílez (2009) has suggested that the inclusion of such details can motivate students to study chemistry and even perhaps understand the underlying controversial ideas. According to the author: “Objectivity, certainty and infallibility as universal values of science may be challenged studying the controversial scientific ideas in their original context of inquiry …” (p. 1204). Classified as Level III. This seems to be sound advice for making the science curriculum more relevant for the students. 3.2.7 Discovery and ObjectivityAccording to Kipnis (2007), learning about discovery helps students to understand how scientists work. This led him to conclude that discovery is objective in the sense that having been created it exists forever and cannot be undone: “As to the discovery, if it is done, it is done; it acquires a certain objectivity which no subsequent labeling can remove” (p. 907). This presentation ignores the social context in which scientific discoveries are evaluated, critiqued, accepted, reinterpreted, and eventually even changed by the scientific community. Classified as Level II. 3.2.8 Disinterestedness and ObjectivityKolstø (2008) has argued that the post-academic science differs from academic science in the past, and the inclusion of history of science in the curriculum can facilitate democratic participation and the disinterested pursuit of objective truth. Finally, the author concluded: “Furthermore, in the post-academic mode of research, the scientists’ autonomy is reduced. Although the researchers might have autonomy on the more detailed level, the problem area to be studied is typically defined by the funding agency. Thus, the typical post-academic scientist has become a contractor and has to make dispositions that might give him research contracts. Such research funding relationships makes it hard to claim full objectivity and disinterestedness” (p. 980). Classified as Level II. Achieving “full objectivity” is a complex process and needs to go beyond being disinterested. 3.2.9 Diversity/Plurality in Science and ObjectivityAllchin (2004) has explored the history of craniology and phrenology to show that these were considered to be scientific endeavors, based on huge amounts of data, considered as a “Baconian orgy of quantification” in the nineteenth century. For several decades anthropologists, such as Paul Broca, tried to use skull measurements to prove sexual and racial differences in intelligence. At the time, however, craniology seemed like a straightforward application of the principle of structure and function, namely if mental functions take place in the brain, then the brain’s size should reflect mental capacity. Similarly, phrenology, the study of cranial shapes and proportions seemed very plausible:
The reference to “Baconian orgy of quantification,” instruments and measurements in the nineteenth century approximates to Daston and Galison’s (2007) mechanical objectivity. However, Allchin’s perspective does not foresee the transition from mechanical objectivity to trained judgment, but rather emphasizes that diversity in a scientific discipline can contribute to its objectivity. In a sense this approximates to the interpretation of science as social knowledge as suggested by Longino (1990). Carrier (2013) has outlined the role played by values, value-ladenness, and pluralism in understanding objectivity in scientific development based on the following facets of history of science: (a) The traditional notion of objectivity was strongly shaped by Francis Bacon (p. 2549). Bacon’s notion of objectivity required the scientist to be neutral and detached from the research project; (b) Contrary to Bacon’s rules, history of science shows that values play an important role in the development of science as facts/data in and by themselves do not determine how they are to be interpreted; (c) Values tend to be contentious and thus can be regarded as a threat to scientific objectivity; (d) As Baconian objectivity is hard to follow, pluralism based on value-judgments is a virtue rather than a liability; (e) The social notion of objectivity was introduced by Popper (1962) and Lakatos (1970) and focuses on conflicting approaches adopted by scientists; (f) Longino (1990) has recommended science as social knowledge as the pluralist approach to objectivity helps to correct flaws and thus enhance the reliability of scientific results. Longino is widely considered to have undermined or dissolved the distinction between the epistemic and the social; (g) Pluralism remains as a step in the development of science and eventually gives way to consensus. This is supported by Kuhn’s normal science and also based on the work of Kitcher (1993), Laudan (1984) and Collins and Evans (2002). Finally, Carrier (2013) concluded that pluralism does not detract from scientific objectivity but is a means to achieving objectivity: “Scientific consensus formation is possible because, regardless of divergent epistemic inclinations and predilections, scientists have a fundamental commitment in common, the commitment, namely, to give heed to certain rules in debating knowledge claims. Adopting such rules serves to curb subjective preferences for the sake of producing knowledge that enjoys intersubjective assent” (p. 2565). Classified as Level V. An important aspect of this presentation is the emphasis on a pluralistic value-laden nature of scientific judgments, within a historical context that facilitates an intersubjective consensus in the scientific community. 3.2.10 Enrollment Practice and ObjectivityIn the 1960s the Swedish government became concerned of the declining number of students who chose to study science as a career. Based on this in the 1970s and 1980s, initiatives were taken to make science more attractive and a fun subject to students, referred to as the TEK-NA projektet (1975). This campaign to foster interest in science led to a conflict as some sectors of the society perceived it as a threat to an individual’s right to a free choice. Lövheim (2014) depicts the dilemma in the following terms:
This is an interesting example of how some reform efforts (more experiments and less abstract textbooks) can be construed to be less rigorous than the traditional science curriculum and thus lack objectivity. Similar relationship between traditional science and objectivity can also be found in other countries. 3.2.11 Evolution, Creationism and ObjectivityDifficulties involved with these complex and controversial subjects is referred to by Smith, Siegel, and McInerney (1995) in the following terms: “It is important to note, however, that good science seeks to be as objective and impartial as possible. The expert scientist not only recognizes that his work may be influenced by personal biases but also overtly seeks to identify and eliminate improper influences” (p. 29). Classified as Level III. With respect to teaching creationism in public schools, Pennock (2002) stated:
Finally Pennock concluded that neither “creation-science” nor “intelligent-design” is an actual or viable competitor in the scientific field, and based on objectivity it would be irresponsible and intellectually dishonest to teach them as though they were. Although this may seem to be sound advice, at least some science educators may not agree with it. Homchick (2010) has studied the controversy between the evolutionists and the creationists in the context of the American Museum of Natural History’s Hall of the Age of Man during the early 1900s. Henry Fairfield Osborn, president of the museum based his curatorial work on the purported use of objectivity as a means to communicate the validity of the evolutionary theory. However, this was criticized by the Baptist pastor John Roach Straton by establishing a different type of objectivity based on pluralistic approaches to theories of origin that included both evolutionary theory and creationist account. Consequently, established as a common value, objectivity ceased to discriminate between scientists and non-scientists. Next, Homchick considers that both Daston and Galison (1992) and Gergen (1994) provide useful lenses to look at the Osborn-Straton debate. With respect to the historical origin of objectivity, Homchick (2010, p. 486) noted:
Similarly, according to Homchick, Gergen (1994) considers objectivity not to be a static characteristic of texts and objects and differentiates objectivity through two general categories that of process and product. Thus, it seems that Osborn relied primarily on the objectivity of the product, namely the artifacts displayed in the museum exhibit. In contrast, Straton used the objectivity of process to criticize Osborn for not including the creationist account. Finally, Homchick (2010) concluded:
Daston and Galison (2007) refer to this form of objectivity as “truth-to-nature.” The Osborn-Straton controversy also shows how the pluralistic approach to science (Giere, 2006a, b) can also be used not only for promoting the scientific endeavor but also the creationist account. Such controversies can provide teachers an opportunity to include topics in the classroom that can lead to lively discussions. 3.2.12 Expert Knowledge and ObjectivityLindahl (2010) has investigated students’ reasoning about conflicting values concerning the human–animal relationship exemplified by the use of genetically modified pigs as organ donors for xenotransplantation:
Following is an example of an episode in which expert knowledge was manipulated by a government for its own political agenda. According to Legates et al. (2015):
This episode provides an interesting and thought-provoking backdrop to Daston and Galison’s (2007) regime of trained judgment as an alternative to mechanical objectivity based on expert knowledge. In other words the opinion of the experts can be politically motivated and hence the difficulties involved in accepting trained judgment as an alternative to mechanical objectivity. Allagaier (2010) has explored the role of scientific experts in the creation/evolution controversy as presented in the UK press:
The presentations by Allagaier (2010) and Legates et al. (2015) provide interesting examples with respect to the role played by experts and expert knowledge in modern society. As part of society experts also have difficulty in being entirely objective and value-free. Perhaps similar constraints can also be observed in the peer-review process used by most scientific journals. 3.2.13 Feminist Epistemology and ObjectivityBased on a critical appraisal of feminist epistemology (Harding, Keller, & Pinnick), Ginev (2008) has advocated a theory of gender plurality that leads to a conception of dynamic objectivity. Harding (1987) considers that using women’s lives as grounds to criticize the dominant forms of scientific knowledge can decrease the partialities in the picture of the world presented by the natural sciences. Keller (1985) has suggested a multi-gendered scientific research that leads to the idea of dynamic objectivity. Pinnick (2005) is, however, more critical by asserting that there are no data that would test the validity of the hypothesis that there is a causal relationship between women’s lives and science’s cognitive ends. Finally, Ginev (2008) concluded: “In a hierarchically organized society, objectivity cannot be defined as requiring value-neutrality: The politically engaged standpoint of feminism is less partial and distorted than the standpoint of conventional scientific inquiry. By implication, the former should lead to pictures of nature and social relations that are ‘more objective’ than those obtained by means of the existing natural and social sciences” (p. 1142). Classified as Level III. This shows that we need to explore the degree to which a field of inquiry has achieved objectivity. 3.2.14 Genetics, Ethics and ObjectivityBlake (1994) has analyzed three pioneer programs (at three universities in USA) that attempt to integrate genetics and ethics in the classroom. A major critique of the study is the lack of continuity between the pedagogical goals and the theoretical framework of these programs. The programs adhered to an underlying framework based on “tacit assumptions” (Keller, 1992, p. 27) that undercut the veracity of ethics, and emphasized reason, empirical evidence, and objectivity. Finally, Blake (1994) concluded:
This presentation was classified as Level III as it clearly shows the problematic nature of objectivity. Furthermore, Blake (1994) refers to two major issues that are of considerable importance to science education. First, she refers to the problem of two cultures, introduced by C.P. Snow (1963), namely a gulf of mutual incomprehension between the literary intellectuals and the scientists. Second, based on Keller (1992) she asserts that scientists are probably less reflective of “tacit assumptions” that guide their reasoning than any other intellectual of the modern age. Indeed, this is all the more ironic as Polanyi’s (1966) tacit dimension was published almost half a century ago. Polanyi (1964, 1966) differentiated between two kinds of knowledge: (a) explicit, articulated, and formal knowledge; and (b) tacit, unarticulated, and non-formalized knowledge. He argued that the first cannot be achieved without the second. These considerations led Polanyi to question the false ideal of “objectivity” in post-Enlightenment scientific thinking. 3.2.15 Historical Contingency and ObjectivityThe contingent nature of science has been recognized by physicist-philosopher James Cushing (1989). According to Cushing (1995), David Bohm’s (1952) work can be seen as an exercise in logic, thus providing evidence that the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics was not the only logical possibility compatible with the facts:
According to the contingency thesis, the same experimental observations can be explained by rival theories (in this case the Copenhagen and Bohm’s interpretation of quantum mechanics). In other words the order in which events take place is an important factor in determining which of two observationally equivalent theories is accepted by the scientific community. With respect to the presumed objectivity of the scientific enterprise, it is interesting to note that Bell (1987) a leading scholar on the Bohmian interpretation of quantum mechanics has raised the following thought-provoking questions: (a) Why is the pilot wave picture (de Broglie and Bohm’s ideas) ignored in textbooks; and (b) Should Bohm’s interpretation of quantum mechanics not be taught? At this stage it would be interesting to consider a possible relationship between Cushing’s idea of contingency and the historical evolution of the regime of objectivity as presented by Daston and Galison (2007). In other words, it is plausible to suggest that it is perhaps the contingent nature of science (among other factors) that manifests itself in the evolving nature of objectivity. Furthermore, it can be argued that the Copenhagen and the Bohm interpretations of quantum mechanics constitute an example of methodological pluralism in the history of science. 3.2.16 Historical Narratives and ObjectivityKubli (2007) has emphasized the need to go beyond the simple regurgitation of experimental details, and provide students with the historical narratives (stories) which provide the background to understanding progress in science:
This presentation shows the need to go beyond the traditional forms of objectivity (and hence its problematic nature) by incorporating the human element involved in scientific progress in the form of science narratives (stories), especially during “science in the making.” According to Klassen (2006): “School science lacks the vitality of investigation, discovery, and creative invention that often accompanies science-in-the-making …” (p. 48, italics added). 3.2.17 History and ObjectivityAccording to Matthews (1992):
Interestingly, in the very first issue of Science & Education, Michael Matthews as founder Editor has set the tone for what he expected the journal to promote, espouse, and cultivate. At the end of the citation, Matthews provides the well-known quote from Lakatos (1971), to the effect that if philosophy of science without history of science is empty, then history of science without philosophy of science is blind. Rest of the citation constitutes a preamble and even perhaps a guide to future research on the application of history and philosophy of science (HPS) to science education. It refers to the difficulties involved in recounting any historical episode, and hence the problematic nature of objectivity. Interestingly, he draws a parallel between the scientist’s theory and a historian’s theory, as both are theory-laden. It is not farfetched to suggest that in the case of a conflict between the two theories, it is the historian’s responsibility to set the record straight. A good example of this conflict is the role played by Holton (1978a, b) in the oil drop experiment that helped to understand Millikan’s handling of his published data. Matthews (1992) provides another facet of this conflict by referring to the case of Galileo, who was considered by nineteenth-century philosophers and scientists as an inductivist and empiricist. However, this picture changed in the twentieth century and Galileo came to be considered as a Platonist dedicated to rationalism and thought experiments. 3.2.18 History of Science and ObjectivityAccording to Leite (2002):
Due to the changing nature of scientific models, this presentation emphasizes the tentative nature of scientific knowledge. Leite then goes beyond by associating uncertainty in science with difficulties involved in finding objectivity and truth. The essence of the idea expressed in this presentation is quite similar to what Matthews (1992) had referred to previously with respect to objectivity in history. Lyons (2010) has stressed that we need to do a better job of teaching students about the process of science. The practice of science is not quite the straightforward objective process that many scientists suggest:
This presentation attempts to establish a balance between how scientists strive to be objective and that the practice of science shows how various factors are influential in the acceptance of a theory and this often leads the scientists to make mistakes. Science teachers and textbooks generally emphasize that the scientific enterprise is based on “facts.” However, this is more complex than it seems at first sight and Lyons rightly points out that, “what is a fact is continually reevaluated.” 3.2.19 Marxism and ObjectivityAccording to Deng, Chai, Tsai, and Lin (2014):
At first sight, this may appear somewhat counter-intuitive, given the strong relationship between Marxism and changes in society. However, the authors go on to clarify that based on the work of Mao (1986), the concept of “practice” has been emphasized and consequently highly valued in China. Mao even considers practice as the sole criterion for testing truth and value of scientific knowledge (p. 847). Furthermore, besides the work of knowledgeable scientists, the term “practice” includes the work of ordinary people (e.g., workers and peasants). This provides the background for understanding objectivity as a consequence of everyday practice in different endeavors. According to Wan, Wong, and Zhan (2013):
It is interesting to note that the two presentations presented above in this section deal with Marxism and still have some subtle differences. Deng et al. (2014) emphasize the importance of practice in Marxism and thus social and cultural influences are sacrificed or ignored as compared to objectivity and rationality in science. On the other hand, Wan et al. (2013) suggest that although the social influence in China is considered less important it is still considered as part of a unity that includes the rationality and objectivity of science. According to Skordoulis (2008), Epicurus rather than Hegel emerges as the pivotal figure in Marx’s early development: “Rather than contained within the idealist philosophy of the Hegelian system, Marx’s thesis aimed at formulating an anti-teleological materialism that incorporated the ‘activist element’ of Hegelianism. Building on Epicurus, Marx’s emergent materialism denied neither the objectivity of nature, as Hegel did, nor humans’ active relation to nature and to each other” (p. 565). Classified as Level II. Besides pointing out the relevance of objectivity for Marx, this presentation recognizes its importance for Marx due more to the influence of Epicurus rather than Hegel. 3.2.20 Mathematics Education and ObjectivityPatronis and Spanos (2013) have recognized the role of hermeneutics in mathematics education and consider Lakatos’s (1976) hermeneutical reconstruction of a historical theme (polyhedral, Euler’s formula and related concepts) as an example. Furthermore, they provide the following guideline for classroom practice:
As a classroom teaching strategy, Patronis and Spanos (2013) suggest the following sequence: setting up of a scene → opening question → dialogue → conflicts → negotiation of meaning. Indeed, this helps to question the objectivist trend not only in mathematics but also in science education (cf. Lee & Yi, 2013; Niaz, 1995a, b). Daston and Galison (2007) provided similar advice based on the dilemma faced by those who tried to understand electroencephalographs using mechanical objectivity based on “a rigid adherence to rules, procedures, and protocols” (p. 325). Instead, they suggested that the electroencephalographer had to cultivate a new kind of scientific self, one that was more intellectual rather than algorithmic. It is high time that science educators recognize the importance of being “intellectual” in the classroom and ignore algorithmic teaching strategies. According to Ernest (1991), objectivity of mathematics can be accounted for as socially accepted knowledge, in other words, it is objective by virtue of its acceptance by the scientific community. Rowlands, Graham, and Berry (2011) criticize Paul Ernest’s philosophy of mathematics education and defend teaching of mathematics as a formal, academic system of knowledge.
Rowlands et al. do recognize the criteria used by Ernest for social acceptance, namely mathematical journals and reviewers. However, in their opinion it is not enough to say that objectivity can be equated with acceptance. Furthermore, in order to support their thesis of how objectivity cannot be equated with acceptance, Rowlands et al. (2011) provide the example of the 4-color theorem. This theorem was proven first by Alfred Kempe in 1879 and later by Peter Tait in 1880. However, 10 years later in 1890 it was found that both “proofs” contained fallacies. This episode led Rowlands et al. (2011) to conclude that consensus for proof (1880–1890) did not mean that the theorem was proved and hence objective. Despite the merit of this interpretation one could argue that it was the community that revealed the fallacies in the theorem and hence shows mathematics to be socially accepted knowledge, as suggested by Ernest (1991). This also illustrates Daston and Galison’s (2007) thesis of the evolving nature of objectivity, which is socially conditioned by the scientific community. Fiss (2012) has analyzed reform movements in mathematics education (based on the documents of the National Education Association, 1894) during the last decades of the nineteenth century that emphasized objective methods of teaching and recommended that rules be derived inductively. Based on this perspective Fiss (2012) concluded:
According to Daston and Galison (2007, p. 198), in the mid-nineteenth century the “scientific self” was considered to be an obstacle to mechanical objectivity and following measures were suggested to combat subjectivity: self-restraint, self-discipline, and self-control. 3.2.21 Model of Intelligibility and ObjectivityDrawing on the use of a balance, Machamer and Woody (1994) draw implications for the intelligibility of a model:
This illustrates what Machamer and Wolters (2004) later referred to as “both rationality and objectivity come in degrees.” 3.2.22 Nature of Science and ObjectivityNature of science is a controversial topic of considerable interest to science educators and had the following five presentations: Talanquer (2013), Irzik and Nola (2011), Wong, Kwan, Hodson, and Jung (2009), Gauch (2009), and Galili (2011). Based on the work of philosophers, historians and science educators, Talanquer (2013) has contested the Universalist characterization of the nature of science (NOS) and then concluded:
This presentation calls attention for the need to understand diversity in the scientific enterprise. If scientists use unique experimental procedures in order to solve complex problems then their conceptions of rationality, modes of argumentation, and standards of objectivity would also vary accordingly. Precisely, this also characterizes the evolution of objectivity in the history of science. According to Irzik and Nola (2011), some of the items mentioned in the consensus view of NOS (this generally refers to Lederman, Abd-El-Khalick, Bell, & Schwartz, 2002) lack sufficient systematic unity which leads to a tension among such aspects and then they go on to provide the following example:
After critiquing the consensus view of NOS (nature of science), Irzik and Nola (2011) then go beyond to assert the objectivity of science as experiments are reproducible and the same experiments done under the same conditions do come up with the same results. This is precisely what Daston and Galison (2007) have referred to as mechanical objectivity. Furthermore, this ignores the fact that in the history of science various scientists doing the same experiments and having the same results came up with entirely different theories. In most parts of the world introductory science courses primarily deal with the history of science and “science in the making.” According to Laudan (1996):
It seems that Laudan was writing the science/chemistry curriculum. Furthermore, history of science is replete with controversies among scientists (cf. Machamer, Pera, & Baltas, 2000). This obviously leads to a dilemma: which history shall we include in the classroom? One laden with experimental details or the one based on theory-laden nature of observations leading to controversies in the history of science. History of science bears witness to the difficulties involved in interpreting experimental data and that the essence of the scientific endeavor is perhaps characterized by the creativity and imagination of the scientists. Under this perspective, telling students that scientists are “objective” and “rational” would be too simplistic. It would be more motivating to reconstruct the different historical episodes in order to illustrate “science in the making” and how science is practiced by scientists (Levere, 2006; Niaz, 2012). Later in the same article, Irzik and Nola (2011) state that scientific knowledge, though theory-laden, is nevertheless reliable because it is obtained by subjecting our theories to critical scrutiny, and
Nevertheless, this overlooks the fact that some long-standing controversies in the history of science were difficult to resolve and continue to provide considerable difficulties to students’ experiences in the lab. An interesting example is the oil drop experiment (Klassen, 2009) which provides, even at present, very contradictory results in almost all parts of the world even with modern apparatus. Daston and Galison (2007) refer to the resolution of the controversy with respect to the oil drop experiment not due to the reproducibility of experimental data, but as an example of “trained judgement.” Also with this background consider Martin Perl’s philosophy of speculative experiments. Finally, it seems that Irzik and Nola (2011) follow quite closely Kuhn’s (1970) advice to science educators, that is just teach “normal science” (for a critical appraisal of Kuhn’s “normal science” see, Niaz, 2011, Chap. 2, pp. 17–33). Wong et al. (2009) turned crisis into opportunity by using the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) to understand and teach the theory-laden observations as part of nature of science in the classroom. They used an historical account of the “hunt” for the causative agent of SARS that was infused with several examples of theory-laden nature of observations. In one of the video clips they showed that immediately following the announcement on March 18, 2002, by a group of scientists from Hong Kong and Germany that the virus causing SARS was paramyxovirus, other research groups around the world quickly announced that they had also found evidence that paramyxovirus was the causative agent of SARS. Interestingly,
This episode clearly shows the importance of “science in the making” and how it can facilitate students’ understanding of theory-laden nature of observations and that objectivity is an ideal that comes with lot of effort and perhaps only in degrees (cf. Machamer & Wolters, 2004). Furthermore, Wong et al. (2009) consider the initial acceptance of the paramyxovirus as the causative agent of SARS and its replacement by the coronavirus as a consequence of new evidence, as an illustration of the tentativeness of science, which is related to an essential characteristic of good science, such as skepticism and open-mindedness. According to Gauch (2009):
Gauch (2009) concluded that it is misleading to say that science is tentative, approximate and subject to revision and that some scholars might prefer that policymakers receive a less skeptical and more balanced view of science’s powers and limits (p. 688). Galili (2011) has pointed out the predicament often faced by science educators in understanding and explaining the essence of objectivity. Consider the following statements:
Many teachers and textbook authors would subscribe to such statements that facilitate an important aspect of the nature of science, namely its objectivity. However, Galili (2011) goes beyond by stating:
Indeed, conditional correctness of scientific knowledge precisely leads to the evolving nature of objectivity (Daston & Galison, 2007). In other words, just as science advances our understanding also changes, and this shows the need for science educators to understand how objectivity evolves. Indeed, the changing or the tentative nature of scientific knowledge has been recognized as an important part of NOS in many reform documents, and can help to understand objectivity in a historical perspective. 3.2.23 Observation and ObjectivitySievers (1999) critiques Alan Chalmers’ understanding of observation as outlined in his What is this thing called science? According to Chalmers when two similar cameras take a picture of the same thing, they produce two identical images. However, Chalmers argues that when two persons “see” the same thing, there are two different experiences, which may be considered as subjective experiences. Consequently, human beings are unlike cameras as “… an object does not produce in each of us the same subjective experience” (Sievers, 1999, p. 389). After outlining Chalmers position, Sievers (1999) goes on to assert the objectivity of observation in the following terms: “On this view, the objectivity of observation ceases to be a philosophical dogma. We can justify our observations in the face of the subjectivist doubts. In so far as people can be trained to be reliable observers, their perceptual knowledge is objective. Such training is an important part of scientific education” (p. 392). This interpretation in which the objectivity of observation can be restored (based on training) approximates to what Daston and Galison (2007) have referred to as “trained judgment.” Those who work in the lab (both students and scientists) can face a dilemma in which they have to make observations, and it is plausible to suggest that “trained judgment” could be one alternative to reach consensus in the case of differences or controversies with respect to the interpretation of data. Classified as Level IV. Felipe Folque, a prominent figure in the development of astronomy as a discipline in Portugal, taught astronomy and geodesy at the Lisbon Polytechnic from 1837 to 1856. Students received an intensive training in the use of astronomical instruments and mathematical methods that were believed to be important in their future work. Carolino (2012) has summarized this experience in which engineers received training at the Lisbon Polytechnic, in the following terms:
This historical experience in the teaching of astronomy and geodesy in the nineteenth century corresponds quite closely to what Daston and Galison (2007) have referred to as “mechanical objectivity.” At this stage it would be interesting to compare the two presentations: Sievers (1999), classified as Level IV, and Carolino (2012), classified as Level II. According to Carolino, students’ work was guided by normalization of methods, standardization of procedures and the culture of objectivity. On the contrary, Sievers emphasizes that objectivity is a consequence of training provided to the observers (trained judgment according to Daston & Galison, 2007). Although, both recognize the importance of objectivity, the difference between the two precisely provides an understanding (Sievers) of the evolving nature of objectivity. In 1860, Herbert Spencer emphasized the importance of science and scientific knowledge. Based on these ideas, Otis W. Caldwell (1869–1947), a botanist and science educator designed general science courses by emphasizing the role played by observations. These courses had considerable popularity in the USA, and according to Heffron (1995), this could be attributed to, “… the historical relationship between science and general education, a relationship established in the opening decades of this century, when the authority of science and scientific objectivity was in the minds of most educators unimpeachable” (p. 227). Next, Heffron (1995) presents a critique of the inductive methods and observations in the following terms:
From a Popperian perspective, Heffron has emphasized that the real test of scientific truth lies not in its obedience to our observations, but in its falsifiability, the belief that scientific truths are only temporarily valid and subject ultimately to falsification. Based on this perspective, Heffron concluded that Caldwell’s vision of science in general education was fundamentally unscientific and even miseducative (p. 245). Furthermore, it is important to note that Popper’s ideas on falsification have been the subject of considerable controversy in the philosophy of science literature (cf. Lakatos, 1970). 3.2.24 Piaget’s Epistemic Subject and ObjectivityPiaget’s developmental stages have been the subject of considerable controversy in both the psychology and science education literature. Brainerd (1978) has critiqued Piaget’s developmental stages on empirical grounds, namely children and adolescents do not acquire the different stages at the ages stipulated by the theory, and hence Piagetian theory has been falsified. This is a very Popperian approach to understand progress and ignores the fact that Piaget’s oeuvre is based on the presupposition that developmental stages correspond to an epistemic subject—universal scientific reasoning, ideally present in all human beings (cf. Beth & Piaget, 1966, p. 308). In other words, Piaget was not studying the average of all human abilities, but rather the ideal conditions under which a psychological subject (a particular person) could perhaps attain the competence exemplified by the epistemic subject (for details see Niaz, 1991, p. 570). Kitchener (1993) has emphasized the important distinction between the epistemic and psychological subject in Piaget’s genetic epistemology. In order to understand this distinction he draws on Galilean methodology, a version of the hypothetico-deductive method to indirectly test a hypothesis, in the following terms:
Based on this understanding of Galilean methodology, Kitchener provides the following perspective for understanding objectivity:
Rowell (1993) has endorsed Kitchener’s (1993) interpretation of Piaget’s epistemic subject and then concluded: “Presumably an epistemic subject would function in this way, but there is considerable doubt that an actual individual would achieve rationality and objectivity in the absence of other social agents (Kitchener, 1981)” (p. 133). Classified as Level III. It is plausible to suggest that as the epistemic subject does not exist and hence objectivity can only be a possible ideal that can be achieved, provided all the “social agents” required for cognitive development are operative. Kitchener emphasizes that just like validity and truth, objectivity is part of the normative dimension (epistemic subject) and hence cannot be reduced to an empirical psychological dimension (psychological subject). In a sense, both Kitchener (1993) and Rowell (1993) not only recognize the elusive nature of objectivity but also approximate Daston and Galison’s (2007) understanding of the evolving nature of objectivity. 3.2.25 Presuppositions and ObjectivitySchool science generally endorses a view that comprises of: (a) Foundationalism, science is built on a foundation of unproblematic true propositions and (b) Logicalism, science has a logical method to determine which of two competing theories is true (McMullin, 1987, p. 50). History of science, however, shows that actual scientific practice is much more complex in which controversies based on the presuppositions of the protagonists play a crucial role. Indeed, controversies play an important role in the dynamics of science, especially before consensus with respect to facts and theories has been achieved (Silverman, 1992, p. 177). Silverman (1992) has referred to the difficulties involved in understanding science in cogent terms:
Interestingly, Millikan’s opposition to Einstein’s hypothesis of lightquanta (despite the acceptance of the photoelectric equation) continued far beyond 1915 and Holton (1999) considers it an irony as it coincides with textbook versions of the experiment. Stuewer (1975, p. 88) goes beyond by considering this adjustment on the part of Millikan as “shocking,” considering the fact that even in 1924, in his Nobel Prize acceptance speech, Millikan still questioned Einstein’s hypothesis of lightquanta. In a study based on 103 general physics textbooks (published in USA), Niaz et al. (2010a, b) reported that only five mentioned that Millikan’s opposition to the quantum hypothesis could be attributed to his prior presupposition and strong belief in the classical wave theory of light. This clearly shows the relationship between how textbooks conceptualize objectivity and the practice of science based on logicalism (McMullin, 1987). With respect to the determination of the elementary electrical charge there was a bitter controversy between two protagonists (R. A. Millikan and F. Ehrenhaft), and Silverman (1992) recounts this historical episode by considering that: (a) Study of this controversy helps illuminate subtle and complex issues underlying the experimental interrogation of nature; (b) One does not, as often implied by an idealized perspective of science, simply turn on the apparatus, make measurements, and compare with theory; and (c) Questions always arise over such mundane, yet critical, matters such as the sensitivity of apparatus, effects of systematic and random noise, environmental influences, and the reliability and admission of data. Based on these considerations, Silverman (1992) suggested: “How these questions are answered depends on the philosophical attitudes of the experimenter. Millikan scrutinized his measurements to determine where a particular experimental run was ‘good’—that is in keeping with his expectations [elementary electrical charge, electron]. Ehrenhaft accepted all measurements in the belief [fractional charges, sub-electrons] that that constituted objective observation. The general philosophical climate of the experimenters’ milieu also played an important role” (p. 169). Classified as Level IV. Again, general chemistry and physics textbooks (published in USA) completely ignore the presuppositions of both Millikan and Ehrenhaft (for details see Niaz, 2009, Chap. 7). No wonder, neglecting the role played by presuppositions leads textbooks to endorse what Daston and Galison (2007) have referred to as “mechanical objectivity.” Silverman’s (1992) conceptualization that, objectivity consists not in denying preconceptions, but in the ability to modify beliefs in the light of emerging evidence—provides not only insight into the dynamics of scientific progress but also approximates to what Daston and Galison (2007) have referred to as “trained judgement.” 3.2.26 Quantum Mechanics and ObjectivityAccording to Hadzidaki (2008a), the understanding of objectivity varies in classical physics from quantum mechanics. For example, in quantum mechanics it is not possible to “… interpret the statements of physics as informing us directly of attributes of the entities under investigation—or, in other words, to judge the objectivity of our knowledge through a comparison with the reality per se …” (p. 69). Consequently, only a “weak” form of objectivity based on inter-subjective agreement can be invoked. Classified as Level III. In a section entitled “objectivity and subjectivity,” Pospiech (2003) noted: “Perhaps one of the deepest consequences of uprising quantum theory was the insight that physical truth is not absolute as many people believed after the overwhelming success of Newton’s work. Suddenly there seemingly occurred quantum jumps; results could by principle only be predicted with probability and depended on the acting of an observer. Attempts to explain these phenomena in classical terms were frustrating. The concept of fixed properties independent of any measurement for single quantum objects had to be abandoned. Only the result of many equal measurements on equal objects could be predicted and reproduced” (p. 568). Classified as Level III. 3.2.27 Romantic Science and ObjectivityRomanticism as a movement emerged in Germany and spread to Europe in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century and has been viewed as a cultural and intellectual movement that countered rationalism then considered as the dominant Weltanschauung (cf. Cunningham & Jardine, 1990). According to Hadzigeorgiou and Schulz (2014):
According to the authors, given the pragmatist/utilitarian conception of school science prevalent today, romantic science can in contrast provide food for thought by emphasizing the notion of wonder and the poetic/non-analytical mode of knowledge. 3.2.28 Science in the Making and ObjectivityNielsen (2013) draws attention to the importance of science as a mode of communication that sustains knowledge. Communication among scientists is what makes knowledge possible, namely technical language, rhetorical resources, peer reviews among others. Consequently, without communication perhaps there would be no science:
With this background Nielsen (2013) suggests that the following be included as an eighth item of Lederman’s (2007, pp. 833–835, also known as the Lederman seven) list of nature of science topics: science is a mode of communication that enables and sustains knowledge in certain ways (p. 2081). This leads us to understand better the distinction between “ready-made science” and “science-in-the-making.” Ready-made science, of course, refers to stabilized scientific knowledge as presented generally in textbooks. It is plausible to suggest that the communicative structure of science would improve if we discuss in class some of the controversial aspects of “science-in-the-making” and how scientists resolved the controversies. Interestingly, this facet of “ready-made science” is widespread in most parts of the world (cf. Niaz, 2016, Chap. 4, in the context of presentation of atomic models in textbooks). 3.2.29 Science, Religion and ObjectivityBased on his criticism of Good (2001) and Mahner and Bunge (1996), with respect to the religious habits of mind, Gauld (2005) has called for a careful scrutiny of the writings of Christian scientists (e.g., Polkinghorne):
This is an interesting example of considering objectivity in scientific and religious habits of mind as academic objectives. Furthermore, it can facilitate a better understanding of both religion and science and also help in teaching controversial topics of the science curriculum, such as evolution. According to Pennock (2010):
Pennock is arguing that the post-modern rejection of objectivity is double edged: on the one hand it espouses liberation from different forms of power structures and at the same time it provides IDC an argument against the prestige of objectively determined knowledge provided by science. Proponents of IDC have acknowledged that it is precisely for this reason that they consider themselves to be deconstructionists and postmodern (cf. Pennock, 2010, p. 759). In this context, it would be helpful to consider some of the ideas introduced by Gauld (2005) with respect to openness to argument and evidence in both science and religion. 3.2.30 Scientific Literacy and ObjectivityAccording to Krogh and Nielsen (2013), in order to achieve functional literacy, “… it is necessary to help students dismantle the naïve view that science is objective and value free, and give the more realistic impression that objectivity is not an all or nothing thing. There are degrees of objectivity” (p. 2061). Classified as Level III. Furthermore, the authors suggested that the inclusion of recent debates within the scientific community based on discipline-specific NOS-insights can help students to understand this facet of science. Machamer and Wolters (2004) have presented a similar thesis with respect to degrees of objectivity. 3.2.31 Scientific Method and ObjectivityBased on a framework that emphasizes the technological dimension, Gil-Pérez et al. (2005) have referred to the wide-spread practice in science education of associating objectivity with the scientific method:
Indeed, the ambiguity, uncertainty, creativity, and intuitive aspects of the scientific endeavor are essential if we want our students to understand “science in the making.” Depew (2010) has referred to the scientific method in the context of Darwinism:
It is important to note the difficulties involved in teaching evolution and how at times Darwinism is not considered really a science but perhaps a secular religion. Indeed, to promote the idea that all science is well confirmed is misleading and the inability to discuss this in class leads to the difficulties involved in teaching evolution and understanding Darwinism. According to Kosso (2009): “The point here is that the scientific method, and the information gained through observation, can be essentially under the influence of what the scientists have in mind, without compromising the objectivity of the method or the information” (p. 38). Classified as Level I. Kosso’s argument is that scientific method is essentially global, in other words any model that describes testing of individual hypotheses, one at a time and in isolation from other theoretical information, is inaccurate (p. 41). However, textbooks generally argue that it is a sequence of steps in a scientific method that makes science objective and this creates difficulties in understanding how science is done. 3.2.32 Scientific Methodology and ObjectivityRusanen and Pöyhönen (2013) have suggested that scientific concepts could be understood as communally shared epistemic tools that scientists use to coordinate their efforts in their common tasks of knowledge production. Working with mechanisms of conceptual change, these authors have reported that: “… the objectivity and correctness of scientific inference are guaranteed by communication and error correction within the research group and within the wider scientific community. Importantly, this picture of scientific concepts applies also in less strongly distributed cases: what is referred to by speaking of scientific concepts are not mental representations of individuals but pieces of scientific knowledge that can be shared by a community of individuals” (p. 1393). Classified as Level IV. This presentation approximates to Daston and Galison’s (2007) idea of “trained judgment.” Develaki (2008) first points out that the traditional ethics of science are based on objectivity, empirical control, and precision measurement. Furthermore, scientific knowledge is also projected as autonomous and neutral since it was considered to be substantiated and established exclusively on the basis of empirical and logical criteria. In contrast, critical philosophy focuses on the interaction between science and society:
Comparing the presentations of Rusanen et al. (2013) and Develaki (2008), it can be observed that the former explicitly posits the critical role played by communication within the scientific community, whereas the latter only refers to the problematic nature of objectivity. 3.2.33 Scrutinized Scientific Knowledge and ObjectivityAbd-El-Khalick (2013) has clarified the difference between the social and relativistic notions of scientific knowledge in the context of understanding objectivity:
Ford (2008) has referred to the dilemma faced by a scientist during theory choice, as no set of objective rules can provide guidelines for selecting a theory:
3.2.34 Social/Cultural Milieu and ObjectivityAccording to Cobern (1995):
By colloquial positivism Cobern (1995) is not referring to the philosophical sense, generally referred to as logical positivism or logical empiricism, but rather in the sense of a mythology of school science as referred to by Smolicz and Nunan (1975). Based on this clarification, Cobern (1995) then goes on to critique the traditional practice of science education:
Cobern’ main concern is to show that discovery in science inevitably takes place in a social and cultural milieu and lacks the certainty school science tries to convey as a dogma (cf. as reproduced in Niaz, Klassen, McMillan, & Metz, 2010b). Interestingly, a recent study has highlighted the importance of the status of certainty/uncertainty of physics knowledge as a means to facilitate conceptual understanding: “The knowledge that has already been acquired allows the researchers to raise new questions because there is uncertainty; a given study aims to decrease this uncertainty and then new questions emerge, again pointing out new uncertainty. This dynamics of uncertainty based on knowledge is a way of developing knowledge. We also consider that, in the students’ processes of construction of knowledge, uncertainty can drive the learning process of knowledge” (Tiberghein, Cross, & Sensevy, 2014, p. 931). This clearly shows that uncertainty with respect to scientific knowledge need not be a constraint in learning science but rather can even facilitate construction of new knowledge. Consequently, questioning the role of objectivity in the “strict” sense has important implications for science education. 3.2.35 Social Nature of Scientific KnowledgeAccording to Howard (2009), “science’s own unreflected pretensions to objectivity” (p. 212) needs to be countered with the social dimensions of knowledge as reflected in the early work (Mannheim, Fleck, Zilsel, & Merton) and more recent work on the social epistemology of science (Longino, Solomon, & Kusch). However, he feels that work on the social dimensions of scientific knowledge has been somewhat peripheral to mainstream work in epistemology and philosophy of science, and that the field has yet to mature. For example, Howard considers (p. 212) Steve Fuller’s intervention unfortunate on behalf of the defendants, hence on behalf of requiring the teaching of intelligent design in public schools, in the Katzmiller v. Dover case of 2005. Fuller was the founding editor of the journal Social Espistemology, that aspired to be an effective voice in the reform of scientific and social practice affecting science. Classified as Level III. According to Uebel (2004): “Yet note that the [Vienna] Circle’s intersubjective meaning criterion did not only play a negative but also a positive role (it was not merely an ad hominem device for segregating metaphysics). The notion of intersubjectivity also provided the framework within which it was possible for science to attain its autonomy from philosophy: it opened the possibility for replacing the ‘metaphysical’ idea of objectivity. The objectivity of science did not consist in the provision of distortionless reflections of reality—of ‘views from nowhere’—but in the possibility for intersubjective control of perspectival views and assertions” (p. 54). (Classified as Level III). Based on these considerations, Uebel concluded that the intersubjective perspective required not only the adoption of radical fallibilism but also the recognition of the social character of scientific knowledge. According to Allchin (1999): “The many cases of bias and error in science have led philosophers to more explicit notions of the social component of objectivity. Helen Longino (1990), for example, underscores the need for criticism from alternative perspectives and, equally, for responsibly addressing criticism. She thus postulates a specific institutional, or social, structure for achieving Merton’s ‘organized skepticism’” (p. 6). Classified as Level III. It can be observed that the science education literature has shown considerable interest in the social nature of scientific knowledge and consequently its implications for classroom practice, especially for teaching controversial topics. 3.2.36 Theory-Laden Observation and ObjectivityBased primarily on the work of Kuhn (1970) and the Duhem-Quine thesis, observations are influenced by the theories/beliefs one holds. In other words all observations are based on some essential theoretical assumptions that may influence the degree to which a scientist may be objective (Godfrey-Smith, 2003). Based on this background, Lau and Chan (2013) designed a study (based on the conceptual change model of Hewson, Beeth, & Thorley, 1998; Posner, Strike, Hewson, & Gertzog, 1982) to explore the effect of theory-laden observations on students understanding of a lab activity:
The lab activity asked students (Grade 9 students in Hong Kong) to investigate whether heating can destroy the vitamin C contents of vegetables. One group of students was told that scientists had found that vitamin C cannot be destroyed by heating and another group was told that vitamin C would be destroyed at high temperature. Lau and Chan (2013) provided the rationale of their study as:
Results obtained showed that the two groups of students obtained data in line with the predictions from the given “theories” about vitamin C, which shows the role played by theory-laden observations. These results helped the students to understand the idea that observations cannot be entirely objective. Interestingly, some students thought that they were “tricked” by the instructor and one student expressed, “How come you give us something wrong …” (p. 2650). Finally, most students became more receptive to the idea that observations are not truly objective. Designing such studies can be helpful in facilitating a better understanding of the scientific endeavor. The role of theory-laden observations and objectivity has been the subject of a study by Park, Nielsen, and Woodruff (2014). On the one hand, these authors recognize the importance of theory-laden observations but still recognize its problematic nature: “Popper … partially endorsed the notion of theory-free observation when a radical change of theory occurs because past experiences or theories cannot guide scientists to modify the anomalies; rather, objectivity, rationality and elimination of subjectivity lead to new theory. Einstein …, Heisenberg …, and Feynman …, outstanding physicists argue that neither 100% theory-independent, nor 100% theory-dependent observation really exists” (p. 1172). Later, in this context these authors illustrate their thesis by providing the example of observations provided by the 1919 eclipse experiments: “Without observational and empirical evidence, a theory cannot stand. For instance, when Einstein suggested the special theory of relativity in 1915, he was not a famous physicist at all. After the observation of the 1919 solar eclipse by Eddington, Einstein’s theory was accepted and then, Einstein became famous” (p. 1172). The actual events related to the eclipse experiments were much more complex. Niaz (2009, Chap. 9, pp. 127–137) has argued that if Edington (considered to be a major expert on Einstein’s theory of relativity) had not been aware of the theory, it would have been extremely difficult to interpret observations from the eclipse observations, as providing support for the theory. Classified as Level III. According to Develaki (2012): “In the philosophy, history and sociology of science was developed a series of documented arguments and disputes that challenged the objectivity of observations and the interpretations of experimental data for principal reasons (and also for practical reasons such as the technological insufficiency of the experimental arrangements), which was noted very early (1928 by Duhem): concretely, given their theory-ladenness and theory-guidedness, experiments cannot, or at least cannot always, identify the erroneous hypothesis within the complex interweaving of auxiliary hypotheses and theoretical principles that lead to a specific prediction that is under examination (e.g. Hanson …; Suppe …; Duhem …; Hume …; Popper …)” (p. 867). Classified as Level III. Later Develaki compares the positions of Kuhn, Lakatos, and Giere with respect to theory choice (p. 870) and concludes that only in very favorable circumstances theories are based entirely on logical and experimental grounds. 3.2.37 Values and ObjectivityAccording to Cordero (1992), scientific practice presupposes both theories and values, which does not necessarily destroy objectivity (p. 50). He then goes on to illustrate scientific practice by exploring the intricate relationship between facts and values: “If history shows anything, it is that in science the facts have rarely been loyal to the values which initially led to their identification. When Darwin developed his theory of evolution, he made liberal use of facts that had been gathered by his teleologically oriented predecessors, but he did not respect the valuations which those facts originally carried. In fact, Darwin’s approach turned teleological biology on its head and initiated the destruction of the man-centered and goal-oriented biology then prevalent” (pp. 53–54). According to Cordero this shows the invariance of scientific facts to value change. This, however, may constitute a dilemma for a science educator who believes that science and the values on which it is based are generally objective. Cordero (1992) resolves the dilemma in the following terms:
Thus a “humane naturalist” would accept science to be objective and at the same time question absolute truths or values—which reflects the problematic nature of objectivity. Several feminist philosophers, including Elizabeth Anderson, Helen Longino, and Janet Kourany, have argued that feminist values can help increase the objectivity and rationality of scientific reasoning, including decisions about which theories to accept or reject. Based on this premise, Intemann (2008) has concluded:
According to Davson-Galle (2012): “…I will contend that, although science is not and cannot be totally value free, the inescapably involved values are benign, not in the sense that that involvement is not influential but in the sense that it does not affect science’s status as objective” (p. 192). Lack of a critical perspective may lead many science educators to agree with this interpretation of values in science. Classified as Level II. After considering the events related to the Vietnam War and the Civil Rights Movement in the USA in the 1960s, Cobern and Loving (2008) have referred to the difficulties involved in understanding objectivity in science, especially in the educational context:
This presentation highlights the underlying tension between scientific progress and the assumptions with respect to its neutrality and objectivity. It is not difficult to see how for a critical student dissonance may lead to tragedy. In order to grapple with such thorny issues science educators will have to reconsider the traditional values associated with the objective nature of science. This chapter provides examples of research reported in the journal Science & Education (35 sections) that facilitate a wide range of perspectives with respect to understanding objectivity. These examples provide a glimpse of research conducted in various parts of the world over a period of more than 20 years. Conclusions based on these findings along with those of Chaps. 4–6 will be presented in Chap. 7. Is a good objective theory falsifiable?What are the criteria for a good objective theory? A good objective theory is testable. If a prediction is wrong, there ought to be a way to demonstrate the error. This requirement is falsifiability, a defining feature of the scientific theory.
What type of theorists use theory to reveal unjust communication practices that create or perpetuate an imbalance of power?Critical theorists tend to reject any notion of permanent truth or meaning, and they use theory to reveal unjust communication practices that create or perpetuate an imbalance of power.
What is theory short answer?In everyday use, the word "theory" often means an untested hunch, or a guess without supporting evidence. But for scientists, a theory has nearly the opposite meaning. A theory is a well-substantiated explanation of an aspect of the natural world that can incorporate laws, hypotheses and facts.
What does an interpretive scholar explore?Interpretive policy scholars approach the issue of generalizability by exploring how insights are constructed, reflect power structure, and omit certain knowledge. Interpretive policy scholars might even ask why society highlights generalizations as the goal of scientific expertise.
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Which theorists are more likely to reject the notion that objectivity can be achieved
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