Bargaining power consists of economic, political, and social influence to achieve demands.

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journal article

The Structure of Collective Bargaining and Bargaining Power: Foreign Experiences

The Journal of Law & Economics

Vol. 6 (Oct., 1963)

, pp. 79-151 (73 pages)

Published By: The University of Chicago Press

https://www.jstor.org/stable/724853

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Current issues are now on the Chicago Journals website. Read the latest issue.Established in 1958, The Journal of Law and Economics publishes research on a broad range of topics including the economic analysis of regulation and the behavior of regulated firms, the political economy of legislation and legislative processes, law and finance, corporate finance and governance, and industrial organization. The Journal has published some of the most influential and widely cited articles in these areas.

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Since its origins in 1890 as one of the three main divisions of the University of Chicago, The University of Chicago Press has embraced as its mission the obligation to disseminate scholarship of the highest standard and to publish serious works that promote education, foster public understanding, and enrich cultural life. Today, the Journals Division publishes more than 70 journals and hardcover serials, in a wide range of academic disciplines, including the social sciences, the humanities, education, the biological and medical sciences, and the physical sciences.

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Read Online (Free) relies on page scans, which are not currently available to screen readers. To access this article, please contact JSTOR User Support . We'll provide a PDF copy for your screen reader.

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journal article

Economic Interdependence, Bargaining Power, and Political Influence

International Organization

Vol. 42, No. 3 (Summer, 1988)

, pp. 461-483 (23 pages)

Published By: The MIT Press

https://www.jstor.org/stable/2706786

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Abstract

Bargaining theory is used to evaluate the proposition that asymmetrical economic interdependence among states is a source of political power. It is shown that asymmetrical economic interdependence does not imply that less dependent actors will be able to exercise political influence over more dependent ones. The use of economic interdependence for political influence requires, instead, that the exchange of economic resources for political concessions make both parties to a relationship better off than they would be if they bargained over the distribution of the gains from the economic relationship alone. Whether this is true is independent of the degree of asymmetry in the economic relationship, or its direction. An explanation is given for the fact that other scholars have reached different conclusions, and the implications of these results for our understanding of a variety of types of relations among governments are derived.

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International Organization is a leading peer-reviewed journal that covers the entire field of international affairs. Subject areas include: foreign policies, international relations, international and comparative political economy, security policies, environmental disputes and resolutions, European integration, alliance patterns and war, bargaining and conflict resolution, economic development and adjustment, and international capital movements. Guidelines for Contributors at Cambridge Journals Online

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Among the largest university presses in the world, The MIT Press publishes over 200 new books each year along with 30 journals in the arts and humanities, economics, international affairs, history, political science, science and technology along with other disciplines. We were among the first university presses to offer titles electronically and we continue to adopt technologies that allow us to better support the scholarly mission and disseminate our content widely. The Press's enthusiasm for innovation is reflected in our continuing exploration of this frontier. Since the late 1960s, we have experimented with generation after generation of electronic publishing tools. Through our commitment to new products—whether digital journals or entirely new forms of communication—we have continued to look for the most efficient and effective means to serve our readership. Our readers have come to expect excellence from our products, and they can count on us to maintain a commitment to producing rigorous and innovative information products in whatever forms the future of publishing may bring.

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International Organization © 1988 Cambridge University Press
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What are the four types of bargaining structures?

The main types of collective bargaining include composite bargaining, concessionary bargaining, distributive bargaining, integrative bargaining, and productivity bargaining.
The bargaining power of the labor force is affected by the degree of unionization, management/labor harmony, and availability of critical skills. Labor's share of total operating expenses can range from very low in automated manufacturing industries to very high in nonmanufacturing industries.

How can the bargaining power of an employer be exercised during collective bargaining quizlet?

The bargaining power of the union may be exercised by striking or picketing, boycotting the employer's products and by obtaining strike authorization from their members to strengthen the position of union leaders in negotiations.

What is the nature and role of bargaining?

Collective bargaining is a peaceful settlement of any dispute between worker and employers and therefore it promotes industrial peace and higher productivity resulting an increase in the Gross National Product or the national income of the country.