Which of the following describes the purpose of the 1964 Gulf of Tonkin resolution quizlet?

Background

On August 4, 1964, President Lyndon Johnson announced that the North Vietnamese had attacked U.S. ships in the Gulf of Tonkin. Johnson sent airplanes against the North Vietnamese and asked Congress for a resolution that supported his actions. Congress authorized the President to take “all necessary measures to repel any armed attack against the forces of the United States and to prevent further aggression” in the Tonkin Gulf Resolution. The vote in the Senate on August 7 was 88-2 with only Senators Wayne Morse and Ernest Gruening opposing the joint resolution “to promote the maintenance of international peace and security in southeast Asia.”

The Tonkin Gulf Resolution gave the President authority “to take all necessary measures” to oppose any armed attack upon the United States; President Johnson and President Nixon relied upon the resolution as the legal basis for their Vietnam military policies. Yet 40 years after the incident, evidence now available reveals that the Johnson administration may have misled the public and Congress about the nature of the Tonkin incident.

The details of the debate around the Tonkin Gulf Resolution reveal that some of the senators accepted Cold War theories of the domino effect and containment, which may have limited their ability to consider a range of responses to the incident. A great deal of information about the Tonkin incident has become readily available to scholars and the public in the past few years. This makes it possible for Americans and others to gain access and attempt to formulate their own opinions.

• For a chronological summary and detailed account of the incident, see the essay "40th Anniversary of the Gulf of Tonkin Incident" by National Security Archive research fellow John Prados. Especially useful are the “Background Information” and “New Evidence” sections. Some of this information is highly technical, but readers without a military background should be able to grasp the main points. Likewise, teachers may decide to embrace Prados’ political arguments or reject them.  This document is on the EDSITEment-reviewed National Security Archive site.
• Historians’ and journalists’ evaluations of the incident, the intelligence and the administration’s response are available in the short article by John Prados "Tonkin Gulf Intelligence ‘Skewed’ According to Official History and Intercepts." Like the previous document, this is available from the National Security Archive. This site also includes links to many other sources related to the Gulf of Tonkin.
• President Johnson’s Message to Congress and an excerpt of the Joint Resolution of Congress are available at the EDSITEment-reviewed Avalon Project at Yale University. The complete Tonkin Gulf Resolution is available at the National Archive’s Our Documents site. For the most readable version, click on “Document Transcript” to the right of the original document. The National Archives is an EDSITEment-reviewed website.
• A short excerpt "The Senate Debates the Tonkin Gulf Resolution, August 6-7, 1964," includes both the Senate resolution, opposition from Senators Nelson and Gruening, and support for the amendment from Senator Fulbright. This site is from The Wars for Viet Nam: 1945 to 1975 linked to History Matters, an EDSITEment-reviewed website.

Finally, former military intelligence official R. A. Mackinnon, an advisor on Southeast Asia in 1965, wrote a comprehensive review of the intelligence on the Gulf of Tonkin. This document totals 111 pages, but reading the first few pages of the Introduction gives the reader a sense for the officials’ own criticism and scrutiny of the Tonkin incident and its use by the Johnson administration. The document is available on the National Security Agency’s website.

This lesson raises a number of questions relating to the Gulf of Tonkin incident and subsequent decisions.  How important was flawed, manipulated, or disregarded intelligence in the American decision to escalate our military involvement in Vietnam following the Gulf of Tonkin incident in August 1964? Did American officials, including President Johnson and Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, intentionally manipulate the information they were receiving to reach the conclusion they wanted? What does historical hindsight teach us about this one specific event and, more broadly, about presidential decision-making in times of crisis? What lessons can be learned that have bearing on current and future policies?

Content Standards

NCSS.D2.His.1.9-12. Evaluate how historical events and developments were shaped by unique circumstances of time and place as well as broader historical contexts.

NCSS.D2.His.2.9-12. Analyze change and continuity in historical eras.

NCSS.D2.His.3.9-12. Use questions generated about individuals and groups to assess how the significance of their actions changes over time and is shaped by the historical context.

NCSS.D2.His.12.9-12. Use questions generated about multiple historical sources to pursue further inquiry and investigate additional sources.

NCSS.D2.His.14.9-12. Analyze multiple and complex causes and effects of events in the past.

NCSS.D2.His.15.9-12. Distinguish between long-term causes and triggering events in developing a historical argument.

NCSS.D2.His.16.9-12. Integrate evidence from multiple relevant historical sources and interpretations into a reasoned argument about the past.

Lesson Activities

Activity 1. Domestic vs. Military Considerations

Step One:

Students should read or listen to LBJ’s two conversations with Robert McNamara from August 3, 1964, available as Clip 1 and Clip 2 of "LBJ Tapes on the Gulf of Tonkin Incident." The clips are in .wma format, and so running the audio will require Windows.

These conversations reveal the convergence of military and domestic considerations for the President and his Secretary of Defense. Students should write short quotations from the text which demonstrate the connection of domestic political concerns with military actions, then follow each quote with their commentary on how it illustrates this theme

Step Two

To explore this theme further, students should analyze the series of four conversations (Clips 3 through 6) from August 4, 1963, in which LBJ and McNamara discussed and analyzed the second series of alleged attacks. But were these actual attacks? Many historians (as well as McNamara himself) have cast doubt on this question. Ask students to  comment on a variety of possible issues: confusion on the part of the administration; LBJ’s domestic political concerns; and specific issues or details where historians now believe the information was wrong (students would have some background on this from the introductory remarks to each section of the telephone conversations). Teachers can decide to split students into groups, and have each one focus on a specific theme from above, and then report back to the class as a whole.

Activity 2. What’s Important Here?

Next, students should read the text of the August 5, 1964, White House staff meeting (available as a .pdf file) to begin to analyze the military and political intelligence overlap that is so important in the Tonkin Gulf incident. Noting answers on paper, students will comment on three key aspects of this document:

• Do the participants in the meeting think the evidence is clear and convincing that the North Vietnamese have attacked the American ships?
• What reservations are advanced by Cater? How does Bundy respond to them?
• What is Bundy’s attitude about Congress’ involvement in this issue?
• What does this indicate about the relationship between the Executive branch and Legislative branch on foreign policy issues at that time?
• What does the Constitution say about the Executive and Legislative branch in foreign affairs? What, in your (student’s) opinion, is the most important piece of information from these minutes? Explain your choice.

Teachers may find the following definitions helpful in preparing for this lesson; they can determine how to share with their students:

• DRV – Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North Vietnam)
• ChiComs – The People’s Republic of China (Communist China)
• USIA – United States Information Agency

W.Y.S. – William Y. Smith (initials at end), staff member of the National Security Council, working for McGeorge Bundy

Activity 3. LBJ’s Rationale and the Dissenters

Finally, students should analyze President Johnson’s Message to Congress of August 5, 1964, presenting the case for a Congressional commitment to military action in Southeast Asia; a small part of the Senate debate on it (focusing on Senators Morse and Gruening’s dissents); and the resolution itself. On LBJ’s speech, students should examine two topics: LBJ’s use of recently received intelligence  (using the knowledge they gained in the earlier activity using the phone calls) AND the President’s overall foreign-policy concerns in this matter. In analyzing the debate, students should discuss the two dissenters’ main concerns. Finally, they should discuss the Congressional resolution to highlight the sections that indicate Congress’ acceptance of LBJ’s rationale, as well as those that reflect Cold War politics and ideals.

Assessment

• Students engage in a simulation of the Tonkin Gulf Resolution debate, using the information that is now available – which was not disclosed then – that they have been examining. The goal would be to help them see how differently the debate might have unfolded, if the intelligence had been fully disclosed.
• Students write an op-ed piece for August 8, 2004, on the 40th anniversary of the Gulf of Tonkin resolution. They are asked to reflect on why the original measure was passed and whether they now think the measure was justified, given the information that has come to light.

Lesson Extensions

1. Historical context and hindsight: Students can analyze the evolution of Walter Cronkite’s views on this issue, by listening to Cronkite’s discussion of the Gulf of Tonkin incident and its aftermath, which offers a good assessment of what was known then and now. (Note: this audio clip is nearly 13 minutes.) This clip is linked from the Internet Public Library, an EDSITEment-reviewed website.

Students could analyze part of an article by National Security Agency historian Robert J. Hanyok on military intelligence and the Tonkin Gulf, which confirms what some historians have long argued: that there was no second attack on U.S. ships in Tonkin on August 4, 1964. The document is long, but teachers could decide what portions they want to use with their students. This document is from the National Security Archive, linked to the EDSITEment-reviewed History Matters site.

2. Going to War: Students could compare and contrast LBJ’s speech to Congress on the Tonkin Gulf incident with those of other presidents seeking Congressional support for war:

• James Polk on the need for war with Mexico, May 11, 1846. This text is available from New Perspectives on the West, an EDSITEment-reviewed website.

William McKinley's request for Congressional approval of his declaration of war against Spain, April 5, 1898, is available from The Spanish American War Centennial Website. This site is linked to American Memory, an EDSITEment-reviewed site.

Selected EDSITEment Websites

American Memory

• President McKinley and the Declaration of War

The Avalon Project at Yale Law School

• President Johnson’s Message to Congress and an excerpt of the Joint Resolution of Congress

National Archives Education

• Tonkin Gulf Resolution

National Security Archive

• Essay: 40th Anniversary of the Gulf of Tonkin Incident
• LBJ Tapes on the Gulf of Tonkin Incident
• R.A. Mackinnon, "The Gulf of Tonkin Incident"
• Robert J. Hanyok, ‘Skunks, Bogies, Silent Hounds and the Flying Fish: The Gulf of Tonkin Mystery, 2-4 August, 1964’
• The Senate Debates the Tonkin Gulf Resolution, August 6-7, 1964
• “Tonkin Gulf Intelligence ‘Skewed’ According to Official History and Intercepts”
• White House Staff Meeting, August 5, 1964

Internet Public Library

• National Public Radio
  • Walter Cronkite, ‘Gulf of Tonkin’s Phantom Attack’

New Perspectives on the West

• James K. Polk, Message on War with Mexico, May 11, 1846