The scientific method cannot be used to answer questions about immaterial and philosophical issues.

Abstract

Philosophers of science have claimed that the position of biology among the sciences is the most prominent and controversial issue of the philosophy of biology. Some authors consider biology merely a "province" of physics and reducible to physics, others uphold the autonomy of biology, while still others have decided that biology lacks the rigor to justify being considered a genuine science. In my own analysis of this problem. I have concluded that the science of biology has all the attributes of a genuine science, as well as a number of other characteristics restricted to biology. These characteristics are listed and discussed. They justify ranking biology as an autonomous science, just as autonomous as physics and many other sciences.

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Current issues are now on the Chicago Journals website. Read the latest issue.The Quarterly Review of Biology (QRB) has presented insightful historical, philosophical, and technical treatments of important biological topics since 1926. As the premier review journal in biology, the QRB publishes outstanding review articles of generous length that are guided by an expansive, inclusive, and often humanistic understanding of biology. Beyond the core biological sciences, the QRB is also an important review journal for scholars in related areas, including policy studies and the history and philosophy of science. A comprehensive section of reviews on new biological books provides educators and researchers with information on the latest publications in the life

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Since its origins in 1890 as one of the three main divisions of the University of Chicago, The University of Chicago Press has embraced as its mission the obligation to disseminate scholarship of the highest standard and to publish serious works that promote education, foster public understanding, and enrich cultural life. Today, the Journals Division publishes more than 70 journals and hardcover serials, in a wide range of academic disciplines, including the social sciences, the humanities, education, the biological and medical sciences, and the physical sciences.

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journal article

Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition

Vol. 171, No. 1, Special Issue: SELECTED PAPERS FROM THE AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL ASSOCIATION, PACIFIC DIVISION, 2013 MEETING (October 2014)

, pp. 3-16 (14 pages)

Published By: Springer

https://www.jstor.org/stable/24704245

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Abstract

In Metaphysical Themes: 1274–1671, Robert Pasnau compares the medieval and early modern approaches to the material-immaterial divide and suggests the medievals held the advantage on this issue. I argue for the opposite conclusion. I also argue against his suggestion that we should approach the divide through the notion of a special type of extension for immaterial entities, and propose that instead we should focus on their indivisibility.

Journal Information

Philosophical Studies was founded in 1950 by Herbert Feigl and Wilfrid Sellars to provide a periodical dedicated to work in analytic philosophy. The journal remains devoted to the publication of papers in exclusively analytic philosophy. Papers applying formal techniques to philosophical problems are welcome. The principal aim is to publish articles that are models of clarity and precision in dealing with significant philosophical issues. It is intended that readers of the journal will be kept abreast of the central issues and problems of contemporary analytic philosophy.

Publisher Information

Springer is one of the leading international scientific publishing companies, publishing over 1,200 journals and more than 3,000 new books annually, covering a wide range of subjects including biomedicine and the life sciences, clinical medicine, physics, engineering, mathematics, computer sciences, and economics.

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Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition © 2014 Springer
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