When the French and Indian War finally ended in 1763, no British subject on either side of the Atlantic could have foreseen the coming conflicts between the parent country and its North American colonies. Even so, the seeds of these conflicts were planted during, and as a result of, this war. Keep in mind that the French and Indian War (known in Europe as the Seven Years' War) was a global conflict. Even though Great Britian defeated France and its allies, the
victory came at great cost. In January 1763, Great Britain's national debt was more than 122 million pounds [the British monetary unit], an enormous sum for the time. Interest on the debt was more than 4.4 million pounds a year. Figuring out how to pay the interest alone absorbed the attention of the King and his ministers. Nor was the problem of the imperial debt the only one facing British leaders in the wake of the Seven Years' War. Maintaining order in America was a significant challenge. Even with Britain's acquisition of Canada from France, the prospects of peaceful relations with the Native America tribes were not good. As a result, the British decided to keep a standing army in America. This decision would lead to a variety of problems
with the colonists. In addition, an uprising on the Ohio frontier - Pontiac's Rebellion - led to the Proclamation of 1763, which forbade colonial settlement west of the Allegany Mountains. This, too, would lead to conflicts with land-hungry settlers and land speculators like George Washington (see map above). British leaders also felt the need to tighten control over their empire. To be sure, laws regulating imperial trade and navigation had been on the books for generations, but American
colonists were notorious for evading these regulations. They were even known to have traded with the French during the recently ended war. From the British point of view, it was only right that American colonists should pay their fair share of the costs for their own defense. If additional revenue could also be realized through stricter control of navigation and trade, so much the better. Thus the British began their attempts to reform the imperial system. In 1764, Parliament enacted the
Sugar Act, an attempt to raise revenue in the colonies through a tax on molasses. Although this tax had been on the books since the 1730s, smuggling and laxity of enforcement had blunted its sting. Now, however, the tax was to be enforced. An outcry arose from those affected, and colonists implemented several effective protest measures that centered around boycotting British goods. Then in 1765, Parliament enacted the Stamp Act, which placed taxes on paper, playing cards, and every legal
document created in the colonies. Since this tax affected virtually everyone and extended British taxes to domestically produced and consumed goods, the reaction in the colonies was pervasive. The Stamp Act crisis was the first of many that would occur over the next decade and a half. For additional documents related to these topics, search Loc.gov using such key words as Stamp Act, Indians, western
lands, colonial trade, navigation, and the terms found in the documents. Another strategy is to browse relevant collections by date.
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- Preventing Diplomatic Recognition of the Confederacy, 1861–1865
Preventing Diplomatic Recognition of the Confederacy, 1861–1865
Introduction
One of the most important victories won by the United States during the Civil War was not ever fought on a battlefield. Rather, it was a series of diplomatic victories that ensured that the Confederacy would fail to achieve diplomatic recognition by even a single foreign government. Although this success can be attributed to the skill of Northern diplomats, the anti-slavery sentiments of the European populace, and European diversion to crises in Poland and Denmark, the most important factor stills rises from the battlefields on American soil. The Confederate states were incapable of winning enough consecutive victories to convince European governments that they could sustain independence.
Artistic rendering of the Cotton Gin, central to the Southern Cotton Plantation Economy
Impact of Northern Blockade
Southerners began the war effort confident that the cotton their plantations provided European textile manufacturers would naturally ally their governments to the Confederacy, especially Great Britain. After declaring secession, the North would declare a blockade on Southern ports. Any interruption of cotton supply would disrupt the British economy and reduce the workers to starvation, they thought. Britain would have to break the blockade and provoke a war with the North that would allow Confederates to solidify independence and gain international recognition.
When the Union did declare a blockade upon the rebel states in April 1861, however, it did not prompt the response expected from the Europeans. The blockade’s legal and political implications took on greater significance than its economic effects because it undermined Lincoln’s insistence that the war was merely an internal insurrection. A blockade was a weapon of war between sovereign states. In May, Britain responded to the blockade with a proclamation of neutrality, which the other European powers followed. This tacitly granted the Confederacy belligerent status, the right to contract loans and purchase supplies in neutral nations and to exercise belligerent rights on the high seas. The Union was greatly angered by European recognition of Southern belligerency, fearing that is was a first step toward diplomatic recognition, but as British Foreign Secretary Lord John Russell said, “The question of belligerent rights is one, not of principle, but of fact.”
British Foreign Secretary Lord John Russell.
Sensitive to any further international recognition of the Confederates as statesmen rather than rebels, Secretary of State William H. Seward instructed Charles Francis Adams, Minister to England and the son of former Secretary of State and President John Quincy Adams, to warn the British not to “fraternize with our domestic enemy,” whether officially or unofficially, or risk an Anglo-American war. But the Union realized that Europe’s declarations of neutrality also constituted official acceptance of the blockade, a position with many long-standing implications. Although international law stated that a blockade must be “physically effective” to be legally binding on neutral powers, the definition was ambiguous. From before the War of 1812, the United States had insisted upon a strict definition in order to maintain trading rights as a neutral. Now, however, the United States was the belligerent and Britain the predominant neutral power. By officially respecting the Union blockade, even if it was not fully “physically effective,” Britain maintained a consistent position on belligerent rights. The U.S. reversal of its traditional position stressing neutral rights set the precedent that it would be obligated to respect the British argument in future naval issues.